From the Qajars to the Islamic Republic: Iran’s Struggle for Autonomy

Abstract

This article examines the long-term dynamics of Iranian-Russian relations by situating contemporary interactions within a broader historical framework extending from the Qajar era to the Islamic Republic. Much of the existing literature analyzes bilateral relations primarily in the context of the Pahlavi period or the post-1979 regime. By contrast, this study argues that the pattern of cooperation and tension between Tehran and Moscow reflects a recurring geopolitical strategy rooted in Iran’s historical struggle to preserve autonomy amid competing great powers. Drawing on historical analysis, the article demonstrates that Iran has consistently pursued a strategy of “negative balance,” seeking to counter the influence of dominant external powers by leveraging rivalries among them. Beginning with the Russo-Persian wars of the nineteenth century, Iran’s territorial losses and strategic vulnerability compelled its rulers to adopt pragmatic diplomatic strategies d esigned to preserve sovereignty despite structural weakness. During the Qajar period, Iran attempted to balance Russian influence by cultivating ties with Britain, while later regimes sought to offset Soviet power
through closer relations with the US. After the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic articulated this approach through the doctrine of “Neither East nor West,” reinforcing a pattern of cautious engagement with competing powers rather than alignment with any single patron. Although recent developments -including arms transfers, geopolitical coordination, and shared opposition to Western influence —have prompted some observers to describe Iran and Russia as strategic partners, this article argues that their relationship remains largely transactional. Historical grievances, divergent strategic interests, limited economic integration, and
mutual suspicions constrain the emergence of a durable alliance. By placing current ties within a historical trajectory, this study shows that Iran’s engagement with Russia is best understood not as a strategic partne rship but as part of a broader strategy aimed at maintaining strategic autonomy in a competitive international system.