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ҚР ЖӘНЕ РФ ТАРИХШЫЛАРЫНЫҢ  
БІРЛЕСКЕН ЖҰМЫС ТОБЫНЫҢ ЗЕРТТЕУЛЕРІ  
ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ СОВМЕСТНОЙ  
РАБОЧЕЙ ГРУППЫ ИСТОРИКОВ РК И РФ  
A STUDY BY A JOINT WORKING GROUP OF HISTORIANS FROM  
KAZAKHSTAN AND RUSSIA

<https://doi.org/10.31489/3134-9102/2026-1-1/215-226>  
UDC 93/94

Received: 06 January 2026 | Accepted: 27 February 2026

Ye. Abil<sup>1</sup> , A. Kuzembayuly<sup>2</sup> 

<sup>1</sup> *Mazhilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, Kazakhstan;*

<sup>2</sup> *Akhmet Baitursynuly Kostanay Regional University, Kostanay, Kazakhstan*

(E-mail: [yerkinabil@gmail.com](mailto:yerkinabil@gmail.com); [topai240345@mail.ru](mailto:topai240345@mail.ru))

## The Golden Horde in Kazakhstan's Commemorative Policy

This article examines historical memory as a key resource in shaping national identity and state legitimacy, focusing on the continuity between the Kazakhs and the Ulus of Jochi (Golden Horde). The theoretical section shows that collective memory is closely connected with nation, nationalism, and identity. Drawing on the works of E. Smith, A. Assmann, and social psychology, memory is defined as a “mnemonic resource” that strengthens group solidarity, values, and norms, while also carrying the potential for conflict in cases of competing interpretations of the past. The article then reviews the historiography of Kazakh–Golden Horde continuity. Pre-revolutionary scholarship largely recognized a direct historical and ethnocultural link between the Kazakhs and the Horde. In the early Soviet period, scholars sought to interpret Kazakh ethnogenesis within the context of the uluses of Jochi and Chagatai; however, from the 1930s–1940s this approach was labeled “nationalist” and removed from official historiography. Soviet historical science subsequently denied a direct Kazakh–Golden Horde connection, asserting the White Horde as the sole predecessor of the Kazakh Khanate. Special attention is given to contemporary memory politics, in which the Ulus of Jochi is presented not as an object of ethnic “privatization” but as a shared heritage of the Turkic peoples, with Kazakhstan as a key historical space. This approach emphasizes a civilizational perspective, rejects the instrumentalization of “historical traumas,” and promotes an integrative model of historical knowledge. The conclusion formulates the main elements of the contemporary interpretation: the formation of Kazakh ethnicity and culture within the Ulus of Jochi, recognition of the Golden Horde as the apex of Great Steppe statehood, its decisive impact on Central Eurasian political, cultural, and linguistic processes, and acknowledgment of the Kazakhs and other Turkic peoples as its joint heirs.

*Keywords:* historical memory; memory politics; historiography; Ulus of Jochi; Golden Horde; Kazakh Khanate; Great Steppe statehood.

### Introduction

The theme of memory has become widespread in connection with the discussion of a number of issues, which has given them a certain political resonance. Among these issues are:

1. Questions of nation building, which are relevant for the newly formed states that emerged on the territory of the former Soviet Union and socialist Yugoslavia. These processes have brought to the fore the problem of ethnicity and interethnic relations, in particular, the relationship between civic and ethnic nationalism.

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\* Corresponding author's e-mail: [yerkinabil@gmail.com](mailto:yerkinabil@gmail.com)

2. Issues of identity, not only national but also civilizational, which have become more acute in the context of the geopolitical shift caused by the collapse of the bipolar structure of international relations and the accompanying “clash of civilizations.”

3. Academic discussions about the nature of historical knowledge and the status of historical science in modern society [1; 12-13].

Constructivist views on identity formation, which have become widespread in recent decades, have led to active attempts to construct new versions of historical memory for political purposes, as a means of legitimizing political situations and decisions. Representatives of constructivism, which has become the dominant school in contemporary ethnology and cultural anthropology, consider all efforts by historians to trace any historical, ethnogenetic, or cultural continuity between the population of the Ulug Ulus (Golden Horde) and modern ethnic groups, including the Kazakhs, as a process of forming a “national historical myth” caused by the claims of new independent states to a certain “political heritage” inherited from fictional “great ancestors.”

In this regard, it is particularly interesting to study the historical memory of the Kazakhs themselves in the 18th and 19th centuries, when elements of modern scientific discourse were not included in the processes of forming historical memory. It is well known that historical consciousness is part of national identity. If we consider society as a complex system, the elements of which are connected not only horizontally—through various types of social ties—but also vertically, i.e., in time, then it is historical consciousness that plays the role of vertical ties. Through it, society identifies itself and determines its place in the world historical process. Accordingly, the study of the historical memory of the Kazakhs of the “pre-scientific” era can demonstrate the actual, rather than artificially constructed, historical connections between different groups in the post-Horde space.

#### *Materials and Methods*

The empirical basis of the study consists of official and public materials reflecting the commemorative policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan with regard to the legacy of the Golden Horde. These include programmatic and conceptual documents of state authorities, speeches and statements by political leaders, texts related to anniversary and memorial events, as well as materials from state and quasi-state museums, exhibition projects, and memorial sites. In addition, the study draws on history textbooks and teaching materials officially recommended for secondary and higher education, as well as publications in state and state-affiliated mass media devoted to issues of historical heritage and national identity. Supplementary empirical material includes transcripts of academic and expert discussions, proceedings of scholarly conferences, and public lectures in which interpretations of the Golden Horde are articulated and disseminated within the framework of contemporary historical policy.

The methodological framework of the study is based on a combination of general scholarly and specialized historical methods. The key approach is the historiographical method, which is used to analyze the evolution of scholarly interpretations of the history of the Golden Horde, to identify the main stages in the development of historiography, as well as dominant concepts and research paradigms. Within this framework, changes in assessments of the role of the Golden Horde in Eurasian history are examined, along with transformations in approaches to the issues of statehood, ethnogenesis, and cultural heritage.

The comparative historiographical method is employed to compare interpretations of the same historical themes within different national and scholarly traditions and to reveal the influence of ideological, political, and cultural factors on academic constructions.

The problem-oriented chronological method is applied to systematize historiographical material according to key thematic blocks (political history, social structures, economy, religion, and cultural contacts), considering the chronological dynamics of scholarly approaches. Discourse analysis also plays an important role, as it is aimed at identifying stable narratives, terminological models, and evaluative clichés used in the depiction of the Golden Horde, as well as at analyzing the relationship between scholarly knowledge and broader historical and political discourses.

The historiographical nature of the article determined the use of the historical-comparative method to analyze the problem under study. It is based on identifying common and specific features in existing historical representations. We see differences in the representation of the role of the Golden Horde in the history of the Kazakhs in pre-revolutionary Russian, Soviet, and modern Kazakh historiographies. At the same time, several competing concepts can be identified within each period.

The theoretical basis for the study was provided by contemporary concepts of historical memory and mnemonic society. The thesis about the interconnection between memory and nation and nationalism is succinctly and vividly expressed in Anthony Smith's statement: "no memory, no identity; no identity, no nation." [2] According to Smith's concept, a nation is a cultural unit of the population that has a name, a separate territory, common myths of origin and memories, a social culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and obligations for all members [3; 104].

The definition of a nation as a "mnemonic community" [4] is based on memory as an ethnic resource (A. Smith) and a remembering culture (A. Assmann). According to A. Assmann, "memory culture" is a universal phenomenon. It is directed at a group and implies the fulfillment of a social obligation to preserve in memory that which cannot be forgotten, since "memory culture deals with 'memory that creates community'" [5; 30]. S. Baljinder and M. Ross conducted a socio-psychological study examining the relationship between group identity and historical memory [6; 384]. The study concluded that different groups' perceptions of history, determined by their internal social identity, reflect both the advantages and disadvantages of these communities. On the one hand, positive intragroup biases strengthen social identity and commitment to one's group. On the other hand, these biases can provoke conflict based on misunderstandings between individuals and groups [6; 393].

The authors of the book *Collective Memory and Social Representations of History* identify seven different functions of collective memory related to social identity: 1) defines the group and its continuity, 2) defines group values and norms, 3) increases group cohesion, 4) establishes the value of the group, 5) legitimizes group behavior, 6) mobilizes the group, and 7) influences the current psychological state of group members [7]. American scholars J. Pennnebaker and B. Banasik write that collective memories are powerful meaning-making tools for both the community and individuals within the community. As identity and culture evolve over time, people implicitly reconstruct their history. In the same way, new collectively defined historical memories help to provide identity for subsequent generations [8].

### *Results*

In the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s, a series of actions were organized in Kazakhstan, including discussions at the level of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, within the academic community, the general public, and in the pages of the party press, during which the concept of a direct connection between the history of the Kazakh people and the Golden Horde was subjected to fierce criticism. Thus, under pressure from party organs, the view that there was no direct connection between the Kazakhs and the Golden Horde became officially established in Soviet historiography [9; 842-843]. Russian researcher V. Tikhonov notes that the discussion of the 1943 History of Kazakhstan marked a certain stage in the Soviet representation of the history of the peoples of the USSR, and "Kazakh history served as a kind of testing ground for the search for a new format for writing "national" histories" [10; 162]. There was a transition from anti-imperialist discourse to statist ideology and apologetics for the expansionist policy of the Russian state, with the spread of narratives of Russian national history with its "anti-Horde" orientation to the representation of the history of other peoples of the USSR.

The removal of ideological constraints and censorship restrictions during perestroika and the early years of independence allowed researchers to revisit a number of conceptual approaches to national history, including the issue of continuity between the Golden Horde and the Kazakhs.

During the period of independence, the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted a number of important, fundamental acts, documents, concepts, and other documents that gave impetus to the development of historical science in the country, but also largely characterized the role of the state and the scientific community in the process of forming the historical consciousness of Kazakhstani people. One of the first and most significant documents that influenced the process of forming the historical consciousness of the people of Kazakhstan was the "Concept of the Formation of Historical Consciousness in the Republic of Kazakhstan," adopted in 1995 by the National Council for State Policy under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Concept was developed by a team from the Ch. Valikhanov Institute of History and Ethnology under the leadership of the institute's director M.K. Kozybaev. The main goal of the concept was to define the main priorities of state policy in the formation of the historical consciousness of the people of Kazakhstan.

The development of historical science in Kazakhstan, especially in the field of national history studies in the context of independence, was marked by significant public initiatives: The Year of National Harmony and Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression (1997), the Year of National Unity and National History (1998), and the implementation of the state program "Madeni mura" — "Cultural Heritage" (2004-2011). In 2013, the state program "The People in the Flow of History" was launched. In 2017 and 2018, two pro-

grammatic articles by N. Nazarbayev were published: “A Look into the Future: Modernization of Public Consciousness” and “Seven Facets of the Great Steppe.” In early 2021, in his article “Independence Above All,” President of Kazakhstan K. -Zh. Tokayev noted the importance of forming historical consciousness and drew attention to the need for national representation of the historical process on the territory of Kazakhstan.

However, with regard to the Golden Horde, the view that there was no direct connection with the history of the Kazakhs continued to prevail for a long time. A. Kuzembayuly’s attempt to highlight the special role of the Golden Horde in the history of the Kazakh people, undertaken in a 1992 textbook, was criticized, including by Kazakhstani researchers. In particular, the statement that “Ulug Ulus, known in science as the “Golden Horde”... a state that made a significant contribution to the history and culture of the Kazakh people” [11; 143], became a reason for accusations of attempting to “ethnically privatize” the cultural and historical heritage of all Turkic-speaking peoples of Eurasia [11; 112]; [12].

The situation began to change in 2014-2015. Given the growing interest not only among the general public but also among the establishment in the medieval history of the Kazakh steppes and the natural demand for the legitimization of national statehood, in 2013 Kazakh political scientist T. Kozyrev proposed conceptualizing Kazakhstan as the heir to the Golden Horde [13]; [14]. In 2015, Zh. Sabitov noted that “contemporary Kazakh medievalists should not follow the morally outdated tradition... and begin to perceive the Golden Horde as a state directly related to the medieval history of Kazakhstan” [9; 848].

The role of the Golden Horde in the history of Kazakhstan has been recognized at the state level, and this theme has been actively used in Kazakhstan’s commemorative policy. Back in December 2014, during a meeting with representatives of Kazakh television channels, Nazarbayev directly stated the continuity between the Kazakhs and the Golden Horde [15]. In 2015, as part of the celebration of the 550th anniversary of the Kazakh Khanate, Nazarbayev said that “the Kazakh Khanate is the legitimate heir to the states of the Saka, Huns, and Usuns, as well as the Great Turkic Khaganate, Deshti-Kipchak, and the Golden Horde”.

However, the topic of including the Golden Horde in the representation of national history only began to be discussed directly in 2019. In his speech at the plenary session of the 16th meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi, K. Tokayev stated that such historical milestones as the Golden Horde and the Great Silk Road are inextricably linked to the current cultural code of the Kazakh nation [16]. As part of his annual Address to the People of Kazakhstan in 2019, he initiated the celebration of the 750th anniversary of the Golden Horde at the state level [16]. In fact, it was about returning to the traditional representation of the history of the Kazakh people and restoring stories related to Ulus Jochi in the collective historical memory of the people of Kazakhstan.

The political aspects of the Golden Horde’s return to the representation of national history were formulated by the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, D. Abayev, during a scientific conference in Atyrau in the fall of 2021. In particular, he noted that the Ulus of Jochi is an archetype of steppe statehood, and its basic principles remain relevant in the 21st century, namely:

1. A strong centralized state with a rigid vertical power structure, implying unconditional personal responsibility of officials for their assigned areas of work;
2. Meritocracy, or rule by the worthy;
3. Effective administrative management;
4. A culture of science and knowledge;
5. A culture of dialogue;
6. A culture of diplomacy;
7. Humanity and the value of the human personality.

They noted that existing stage concepts—formational, world-systemic, and others—view the agrarian cattle-breeding societies of Eurasia as side branches, dead ends in the development of humanity. This view of national history leads to the formation of a collective inferiority complex, resulting in a negative attitude toward scientific knowledge, a fascination with pseudo-history, a victim complex, and xenophobia. This does not mean an absolute rejection of the intellectual heritage of European science, but all these concepts must be applied with the tasks of national history in mind [17].

Special attention was paid to the role of the Golden Horde in national history during the National Kurultais. This platform for public dialogue was established on the basis of the National Council of Public Trust and is an advisory and consultative body under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. At the first Kurultai, held in 2022 in Ulytau, the President specifically noted that the choice of venue for the Kurultai had a sacred meaning. He said that “Ulytau, located in the heart of the Great Steppe, has witnessed many historical events. Many important meetings that determined the fate of the nation took place here. This

sacred land preserves the traces of the rulers of the Golden Horde and the Kazakh khans. We are here to ensure that the continuity of generations continues” [18].

During the third Kurultai in Atyrau in 2024, the President emphasized the historical significance of the Golden Horde for national history, especially since the year of the Kurultai coincided with the 800th anniversary of the Ulus of Jochi. These are the following points:

1. Western Kazakhstan, in particular Saraychik, was the most important administrative and commercial center of the Ulus of Jochi and the Kazakh Khanate, and at one time played a major geostrategic role, promoting intensive economic, political, and cultural interaction between East and West.
2. The Ulus of Jochi, known worldwide as the Golden Horde, is the pinnacle of statehood in the vast expanses of Central Eurasia. The geopolitical legacy of this medieval power served as the foundation for the emergence of a number of Eurasian states, including the Kazakh Khanate.
3. For six centuries, the Juchids played a decisive role in the fate of Central Eurasia, striving to form a single civilizational community across a vast territory. The Ulus of Jochi, like the Roman Empire, set the standards for the development of the states and peoples of the Great Steppe for many centuries to come and brought state governance to a qualitatively new level.
4. It was within the framework of the Ulus of Jochi that the fusion of various ethnic groups and religions created a unique model of intercultural symbiosis and state building in the territory of modern Kazakhstan.

The president also outlined tasks in the area of commemorative policy, saying that the history of the Ulus of Jochi occupies a significant place not only in the historical tradition of Kazakhstan’s statehood, but also in the present and future of the country, which are closely intertwined with its historical heritage. It is important that the perception of the Golden Horde in the world is inextricably linked with Kazakhstan, and to this end, it is necessary to use the Golden Horde brand more actively and widely in building our country’s image on the international arena [19].

Speaking at the Fourth Kurultai on March 14, 2025, the President continued to formulate the main provisions of the memory policy. In particular, the following theses were announced:

1. It is necessary to move from an ethnocentric view of history to a civilizational one; we need a “panoramic civilizational view of history that will connect our past, present, and future on a conceptually new level.” The task is to study national history in the context of a broad civilizational paradigm.
2. We need to stop using “historical traumas” and “historical grievances” to shape our collective historical memory.

Directly recognizing historical science as an important factor in strengthening national identity, the president explains the objectives of memory policy—through a new representation of national history that reveals the uniqueness and universality of our people’s experience—to position Kazakhstan as an independent part of world civilization. This will help to formulate Kazakhstan’s modern mission, because “being one of the centers of the birth and development of nomadic civilization means not only remembering our past, but also uniting peoples and cultures, eras and spaces for the common good.” The task is to show the world that Kazakhstan, “as the heart of the Great Steppe, must continue its historical mission, transforming the ancient traditions of nomads into a powerful foundation for steady progress” [20].

During this period since 2019, serious steps have been taken to consolidate symbols associated with this theme in commemorative practice. Memorial complexes were created in Ulytau and Sarayshyk, a series of scientific events were initiated, and funding was allocated for the creation of a series of popular science films on the Golden Horde theme. One of the most significant steps was the creation of the Scientific Research Institute for the Study of Ulus Jochi in Kazakhstan. The idea of creating the institution was announced by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in August 2020. In October 2021, the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan issued a decree on the establishment of the institute, and the legal formalities were completed in April 2022. Actual work began only in 2023, but in a short period of time, the institute’s staff prepared a number of interesting publications, including collections of source materials on this period of national history.

At the same time, it should be noted that Kazakhstan’s commemorative practices associated with the memory of the Ulus of Jochi/Golden Horde do not refer to Kazakhstan as the sole heir to this state. On the contrary, contemporary historical representations emphasize the common historical heritage of the Turkic peoples. One of the ideologists of the return of the Golden Horde discourse to the sphere of collective historical memory, T. Kozyrev, stated in an interview with the portal “Zakon.kz” in 2014 that Kazakhstan is not the sole heir to the Golden Horde. “The legacy of the Golden Horde is the common history of several Turkic peoples: Kazakhs, Tatars, Uzbeks, and others. If each of the children of one father says, “This is only my

father, not yours,” how would that look? But if they once again realize their brotherhood, which not only existed in the past but also obliges them to do much in the present and future, isn’t that wonderful?” he said [21].

“Of course, there can be no question of Kazakhstan privatizing the historical heritage of the Golden Horde; this is the common heritage of a number of Turkic peoples,” emphasized R. Temirgaliev, chief expert at the Institute of World Economy and Politics at the First President’s Foundation (IWEP), in one of his interviews in October 2019 [22]. This idea has also been repeatedly expressed by Zh. Sabitov, director of the Institute for the Study of Ulus Jochi. The President of Kazakhstan also spoke about this, noting in his address to participants at an international conference in Atyrau in October 2021 that “the Golden Horde left a special mark on the fate of many brotherly countries” [23].

### *Discussion*

The issue of political and ethnic continuity between the Kazakhs and the Golden Horde (Ulug Ulus) and the direct connection between the modern Turkic-speaking peoples inhabiting the region and the post-Horde states has long been the subject of intense research. In pre-revolutionary Russian literature, there was no doubt about the direct continuity between the Kazakhs and the Golden Horde. In his “Description of the Kyrgyz-Kaisak,” I. Kazantsev, describing the origin of the Kazakhs, directly links them to the population of the steppes of the Genghis Khan era and notes that “at present, the Kyrgyz-Kaisaks (Kazakhs — author) inhabit the same meadow areas (steppes) where they lived in the time of Genghis Khan” [24; 6]. In the article “Kyrgyz-Kaisaks,” prepared for the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron, A. Pozdneev, it was noted that “the Kyrgyz-Kaisaks (Kazakhs — author) themselves have many contradictory legends about their origin, although they all have one common feature, indicating that this people was formed from the remnants of Genghis Khan’s empire” [25; 95].

Particular mention should be made of the works of Ch. Valikhanov, in which the history of the Kazakhs was examined for the first time by a Kazakh himself, which made it possible for the first time in European science to present its own representation of the historical process on the territory of steppe Eurasia. Ch. Valikhanov repeatedly emphasized the continuity between the Kazakhs and the Golden Horde. In a letter to I. Berezin, he wrote: “According to their legends, the Kyrgyz (Kazakhs — author) consider themselves descendants of the Tatars of the Golden Horde” [26; 163]. In his “Notes on Judicial Reform,” he refers to the Kazakhs as “descendants... of the Baty Tatars” [27; 81].

In an article on the ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs, based on an analysis of the genealogies of individual Kazakh clans, he concludes “about their (the Kazakhs) — author) origin as a union of tribes from the Golden Horde and the Chagatai Horde, which, as a result of turmoil and unrest in the 15th century, were displaced from their native lands and driven into a confused, disorderly movement or flight (busu) — completely fragmented into parts and ended up in different places and lands, mixed with... separate parts of other tribes” [28; 155-156]. At the same time, Ch. Valikhanov refers to the history of the Kazakhs themselves. In particular, in a short work devoted to the historical traditions of the Kazakhs of the Senior Zhuz, he notes that “they (the Kazakhs — author) say this: The Golden Horde and the Jagatai Horde fell, internal unrest divided the unity of the tribes, there was no one to maintain authority and care for society... then the people gathered in the steppes of Ishim...” [26; 275-276]. In addition, he notes that according to the legends of the Kazakhs of Semirechye, all the nomadic tribes of the steppes (Tatars) were called “Nogai”.

In the Soviet past, history, which was highly politicized and ideologically calibrated, took on an almost ritualistic function associated with demonstrating loyalty to the regime [29; 41]. Moreover, the representation of history was under the direct control of the political leadership, primarily the party organs. However, in the first post-revolutionary decades, ideological searches were still ongoing, and party control over science had not yet become total. These ideological searches are reflected in the works of A. Chuloshnikov, M. Tynyshpaev, S. Asfendiyarov, and M. Vyatkin.

One of the first comprehensive analytical reviews of the ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs belongs to Alexander Chuloshnikov, head of the historical and statistical department at the headquarters of the Kyrgyz Military Commissariat and chairman of the Society for the Study of the Kyrgyz Region. In 1924, he published a monograph entitled “Essays on the History of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz People in Connection with the General Historical Fate of Other Turkic Tribes,” which contained an overview of the history of Kazakhstan from ancient times to the 18th century. Chapter 6 of this work contained an attempt to understand, considering the state of science at the beginning of the 20th century, the ethnic processes that led to the formation of the Kazakh ethnic group. First, A. Chuloshnikov, following the popular scientific views of the time, considered the

Kazakhs to be a conglomerate of tribes, the result of “the mixing and merging of the most diverse tribes and peoples...” [30; 112].

The author considered the Uzbek union, formed on the basis of the population of the eastern part of the ulus of Jochi, to be the ethnopolitical foundation of the Kazakhs. “The foundation that created the Cossack-Kyrgyz was not other Turkic tribes, but the same Uzbeks,” he writes [30; 105]. This is how he explains the term Uzbek-Kazakh used by Muhammad Haydar Dulati and the fact that as late as the 1880s, the Kazakh population of the Syr Darya region considered themselves Uzbeks.

In his review of A. Chuloshnikov’s work, M. Tynyshpaev noted that “the Cossacks are simply a conglomerate of Turkic-Muslim tribes from the uluses of Jochi and Chagatai” [31; 74]. In his comprehensive work “Materials on the History of the Kyrgyz-Cossack People,” M. Tynyshpaev considers the Alchins, who formed as an ethnic group before the 13th century, to be the core of the Kazakh ethnic group, while the remaining Kazakh clans and tribes were later included in the Kazakh Khanate and the Kazakhs as an ethnic group. In particular, he considered the Uysyns, Argyns, Naimans, and Kerevs to be descendants of the Chagatai Horde, the Zhalairs and Kanglys to be descendants of the population of the ulus of Jochi Ordu’s son, the Alchins to be descendants of the ulus of Tokay-Timur, and the Kypchaks and Konrats to be descendants of the uluses of Batu and Shiban [31; 182-183]. Thus, he considered the Kazakhs to be mainly descendants of the population of the Golden Horde, with the inclusion of individual tribes of the Chagatai ulus.

S. Asfendiyarov, author of the 1935 work *History of Kazakhstan from Ancient Times*, took a completely different approach to the question of the origin of the Kazakh ethnic group and the role played in this process not only by the population of the Chagatai uluses, but also by the Chingizid uluses as a whole. Accusing “bourgeois” historians, including M. Tynyshpaev, of following “bourgeois” and “feudal-chauvinist” concepts of the direct dependence of the origin of the Kazakhs on the uluses of the sons of Genghis Khan, he notes that “in reality, the formation of the three Kazakh zhuzes can be explained by the historical conditions of nomadic life” [32; 96]. He does not consider the dominance of one or another group of the steppe elite to be important, believing that the emergence of the three Kazakh zhuzes was the result of the existence of three economic regions. “Of course, the movements of the Turkic-Mongol tribes in earlier eras and their mixing were reflected in the names, reflecting the dominance and relationships of various groups of khans and feudal lords. But by the time the Kazakh hordes were formed, these names only reflected the past, and the real reasons for the impossibility of complete political unification, of course, lay in the mode of production,” he notes, completely dismissing the question of the role of individual uluses in the formation of Kazakh identity [32; 97].

In M. Vyatkin’s “Essays on the History of the Kazakh SSR,” published in 1941, the author, analyzing the history of the Kazakhs, notes that: 1) The formation of the Kazakh Khanate and the Kazakhs as an ethnic group are related but not identical processes; 2) The categories “Uzbek,” “Nogai,” and “Kazakh” did not initially have an ethnic character; 3) Until the 16th century, the “Uzbeks” and “Kazakhs” constituted a single ethnic group, and their separation occurred only in the later period. Direct party control over the content of Kazakhstan’s historical representation was linked to the preparation and publication of collective summaries of the republic’s history. In 1943, the first volume of a new summary publication, *History of the Kazakh SSR*, edited by M. Abdykalikov and A. Pankratova, was published. Given that M. Vyatkin was one of the authors of this book, it is not surprising that the representation of the history of the Kazakhs and their place in the history of the post-Tartar states did not change compared to the “Essays.” Later, A. Pankratova noted that “among Kazakh historians there is a tendency... to view the Mongol-Tatar states on the territory of Kazakhstan, which emerged as a result of conquests, as the history of the Kazakh people itself” [33; 222-223]. After the book was harshly criticized by the party leadership at special editorial meetings organized by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as at meetings organized by this edition was significantly revised and republished in 1949 and 1957. It was in these editions that the thesis about the existence of the White Horde state on the territory of Kazakhstan, which became the ethnopolitical predecessor of the Kazakh Khanate, was officially established [33; 222-223].

In addition, following the publication of the Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) “On the state of and measures to improve mass political and ideological work in the Tatar party organization” of August 9, 1944, which explicitly stated that “the Central Committee obliged the Tatar Regional Committee... eliminate serious shortcomings and errors of a nationalist nature in the coverage of the history of Tatarstan (embellishment of the Golden Horde, popularization of the khan-feudal epic about Idige) committed by individual historians and writers, pay special attention to the study and

coverage of the history of the joint struggle of the Russian, Tatar, and other peoples of the USSR against foreign invaders,” the Golden Horde theme began to be mentioned in critical remarks [34; 174].

In a memorandum from the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee to the secretary of the Central Committee, G.M. Malenkov on the ideological and propaganda work of the Kazakh party organization, compiled based on the results of a special inspection by the party commission consisting of employees of the Propaganda Department and the Union of Soviet Writers of the USSR in December 1945, it was noted that “the compilers History of the Kazakh SSR not only failed to express the profound transformative role of the Mongol yoke, but also mistakenly believe that the Tatar-Mongol conquest shaped the formation and development of the Kazakh nation, and that one of the emirs of the Golden Horde, Edige, is glorified as a national hero and defender of the working people” [35; 991].

Criticism was directed at certain historians and writers who “clearly idealize the Golden Horde and praise Edige in every way possible”, in particular, A. Margulan, S. Mukanov, H. Dzhumaliyev, as well as the secretary of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan for propaganda, M. Abdykalykov. In addition, criticism was directed at Zh. Shayakhmetov, second secretary of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan, who proposed during the discussion of the draft resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Kazakhstan “On the preparation of the second edition of the History of the Kazakh SSR” to exclude from the draft all points relating to Edige [35; 997].

### *Conclusions*

In conclusion, let us formulate the main provisions of the modern representation of the history of the Ulus of Jochi in connection with the history of the Kazakhs:

1. Genghis Khan’s state is seen as the revival of the Turkic imperial project, and the military actions of Genghis Khan and his successors on the Great Steppe are viewed not only as conquests, but also as the restoration of the previously collapsed empire of the steppe horsemen.

2. The Kazakh ethnic group was formed within the framework of the Ulus of Jochi/Golden Horde, where the processes that took place in both the eastern (left wing, modern-day Kazakhstan) and western (right wing, southern modern-day Russia and Ukraine) parts of the empire are of equal importance to national history. The processes that took place in the territory of Moghulistan (Ulus Chagatai) are of great importance;

3. The political unions known from sources during the collapse of the Golden Horde (the “State of Abulkhair,” the Siberian, Mangyt (Nogai) Ulus) are not separate states, but alternative forms of political organization of the population of the left wing of the Great Ulus, and the Kazakh Khanate is one such variant;

4. Within the framework of the Ulus of Jochi/Golden Horde, a traditional Kazakh culture developed, represented by both written literature and a rich and diverse oral cultural tradition, musical art, and distinctive material culture.

5. The former unity of the population of the Ulus of Jochi/Golden Horde can still be felt today. The languages of the Kazakhs, Nogais, Karakalpaks, and Kipchak dialects of the Uzbek language are not independent languages, but dialects of a single Nogai-Kipchak language. The Kazan Tatar, Siberian Tatar, Crimean Tatar, and Bashkir languages are very close to it. These ethnic groups also share an early layer of epic tradition. It was the collapse of this ethnocultural massif that led to the emergence of a number of modern Turkic ethnic groups of the Great Steppe in the 15th-17th centuries. Thus, the direct descendants of the Ulus of Jochi/Golden Horde are the Kazakhs, Nogais, Kazan, Crimean, and Siberian Tatars, Bashkirs, and Karakalpaks, while the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were also strongly influenced.

### *Acknowledgements*

*The article was prepared within the framework of the project BR28713085 “Comprehensive interdisciplinary research into the intellectual history of the 20th century and the first quarter of the 21st century based on an analysis of the works of Kazakhstani historians and writers”.*

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Е. Әбіл, А. Күзембайұлы

## Қазақстанның коммеморативтік саясатындағы Алтын Орда

Мақалада ұлттық бірегейлік пен мемлекеттік легитимділікті қалыптастырудағы негізгі ресурс ретінде тарихи жад қарастырылған, негізгі назар қазақтар мен Жошы ұлысы (Алтын Орда) арасындағы сабақтастық мәселесіне аударылады. Теориялық бөлімде ұжымдық жадтың ұлт, ұлтшылдық және бірегейлік ұғымдарымен тығыз байланысты екені көрсетілген. Э. Смиттің, А. Ассманнның еңбектеріне және әлеуметтік психология зерттеулеріне сүйене отырып, жад топтық ынтымақты, құндылықтар мен нормаларды нығайтатын, сонымен бірге өткеннің бәсекелес түсіндірмелері болған кезде қайшылықты әлеуетке ие «мнемоникалық ресурс» ретінде анықталады. Бұдан әрі Қазақ-Орда сабақтастығы мәселесінің тарихнамасы талданады. Төңкеріске дейінгі ғылымда қазақтар мен ордалық мұра арасындағы тікелей тарихи және этномәдени байланыс негізінен мойындалды. Кеңестік кезеңнің алғашқы жылдарында ғалымдар қазақ этногенезін Жошы мен Шағатай ұлыстарының аясында түсіндіруге ұмтылды; алайда 1930–1940 жылдардан бастап бұл ұстаным «ұлтшылдық» деп танылып, ресми тарихнамадан ығыстырылды. Кейінгі кеңестік тарихи ғылым қазақтар мен Алтын Орда арасындағы тікелей байланысты теріске шығарып, Қазақ хандығының жалғыз бастауы ретінде Ақ Орданы ғана мойындады. Қазіргі жад саясатына ерекше назар аударылады: онда Жошы ұлысы этникалық «жекешелендірудің» нысаны емес, Қазақстанды басты тарихи кеңістіктердің бірі ретінде айқындай отырып, түркі халықтарының ортақ мұрасы ретінде ұсынылады. Бұл тәсіл өркениеттік көзқарасты алға тартады, «тарихи жарақаттарды» құралға айналдыруды жокқа шығарады және тарихи білімнің интегративті моделін қалыптастыруға ықпал етеді. Қорытындыда қазіргі заманғы түсіндірудің негізгі тұжырымдары түйінделген: қазақ этносының және мәдениетінің Жошы ұлысы шеңберінде қалыптасуы; Алтын Орданы Ұлы дала мемлекеттілігінің шарықтау шыңы ретінде тану; оның Орталық Еуразиядағы саяси, мәдени және тілдік үдерістерге шешуші ықпалы; сондай-ақ қазақтарды және басқа түркі халықтарын оның ортақ мұрагерлері ретінде тану.

*Кілт сөздер:* тарихи жад, жад саясаты, тарихнама, Жошы ұлысы, Алтын Орда, Қазақ хандығы, Ұлы дала мемлекеттілігі.

Е. Абиль, А. Кузембайулы

## Золотая Орда в коммеморативной политике Казахстана

В статье рассматривается историческая память как ключевой ресурс формирования национальной идентичности и государственной легитимности с акцентом на проблему преемственности между казахами и Улусом Джучи (Золотой Ордой). В теоретическом разделе показано, что коллективная память тесно связана с нацией, национализмом и идентичностью. Опираясь на труды Э. Смита, А. Ассмана и исследования социальной психологии, память определяется как «мнемонический ресурс», укрепляющий групповую солидарность, ценности и нормы, но одновременно обладающий конфликтным потенциалом при наличии конкурирующих интерпретаций прошлого. Далее анализируется историография вопроса казахско-ордынской преемственности. В дореволюционной науке преобладало признание прямой исторической и этнокультурной связи между казахами и ордынским наследием. В ранний советский период предпринимались попытки осмыслить этногенез казахов в контексте улусов Джучи

и Чагатая, однако с 1930–1940-х годов данный подход был объявлен «националистическим» и исключён из официальной историографии. В последующем советская историческая наука отрицала прямую связь казахов с Золотой Ордой, утверждая Белую Орду в качестве единственного предшественника Казахского ханства. Особое внимание уделяется современной политике памяти, в рамках которой Улус Джучи представлен не как объект этнической «приватизации», а как общее наследие тюркских народов при ключевой роли Казахстана как важнейшего исторического пространства. Такой подход акцентирует цивилизационную перспективу, отвергает инструментализацию «исторических травм» и способствует формированию интегративной модели исторического знания. В заключении формулируются основные положения современной интерпретации: формирование казахской этничности и культуры в рамках Улуса Джучи; признание Золотой Орды вершиной государственности Великой степи; её решающее влияние на политические, культурные и языковые процессы Центральной Евразии, а также признание казахов и других тюркских народов её совместными наследниками.

*Ключевые слова:* историческая память, политика памяти, историография, Улус Джучи, Золотая Орда, Казахское ханство, государственность Великой степи.

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### Information about the authors

**Abil Yerkin** — Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Mazhilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, Kazakhstan; <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8722-3992>

**Kuzembayuly Amanzhol** — Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Akhmet Baitursynuly Kostanay Regional University, Kostanay, Kazakhstan; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3662-7003>